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The Pacific has been portrayed as a
sea of islands, whose peoples’ identity,
culture, and livelihood are fundamen-
tally defined by their relationship with
the marine environment. Islanders
have always relied on the sea as a
source of food and as a conduit for
trade and communication with the
outside world. In the contemporary
Pacific, successful development
depends on the ability of sectors such
as tourism, fisheries, and aquaculture
to sustainably manage the marine
environment. Pacific Islanders at all
levels of government and civil society
have focused much of their lobbying
and diplomatic energies on measures
to preserve the natural environment.
In no area has the regionalism of
the Pacific Islands shown such unity
of purpose as in the campaign to pro-
tect the marine environment from
undue exploitation and pollution,
especially by outsiders. In the past this
unity was evident in the campaign to
end nuclear testing and prevent
nuclear waste dumping in the Pacific.
Today it is apparent in regional efforts
to coordinate monitoring and manage-
ment of water, waste, coastal areas,
coral reefs, and the high seas, notably
with respect to tuna stocks. Anti-
nuclear sentiment has persisted in
opposition to nuclear shipments
through the region. Climate change 
is an enduring concern. In 2002 these
issues provided a focus for regional
lobbying and action at several inter-
national forums.
The 2002 Pacific Islands Forum
leaders summit adopted an important
initiative in the form of a Pacific
Islands Regional Ocean Policy. The
policy’s vision is to maintain “a
healthy Ocean that sustains the live-
lihoods and aspirations of Pacific
Island communities.” It emphasizes
the economic opportunities offered by
the ocean but draws attention to the
increasing number and severity of
threats to its long-term integrity. The
new policy is a framework of guiding
principles for collaborative action to
promote sustainable management of
the ocean’s resources. It is meant to
prevent a fragmentation of programs
and conflict between different sectors
as use of oceanic resources escalates.
New Zealand offered to assist with
setting up the initiative (pif 2002,
annex 2).
The overriding “goal of the policy
is to ensure the future sustainable use
of our Ocean and its resources by
Pacific Islands communities and exter-
nal partners. The guiding principles to
achieve this goal are: improving our
understanding of the Ocean; sustain-
ably developing and managing the use
of ocean resources; maintaining the
health of the ocean; promoting the
peaceful use of the ocean; creating
partnerships and promoting coopera-
tion.” The document outlines specific
actions to be taken nationally and
regionally to realize these principles
over the next five years. The principles
and actions form the basis for a
Pacific Ocean initiative, a regional
summit to define current knowledge
and activities, a review process, and
an integrated framework of existing
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programs and future actions (pif
2002, annex 2).
No sector depends more on collec-
tive environmental management than
the region’s fisheries, and this sector 
is in turn the linchpin of many econo-
mies. The alarm has been raised over
a persistently low replacement rate of
tuna stocks in recent years. This is
largely due to juvenile tuna being
caught inadvertently by purse-seining
nets. Forum leaders urged distant-
water fishing nations to increase the
mesh size of nets to reduce the
destructive by-catch (pif 2002, 
para 47–48).
Leaders welcomed the extension
until 2013 of the Multilateral Fisheries
Treaty governing fishing access fees
paid since 1987 by the United States to
the fourteen Forum Fisheries Agency
member states. Other distant-water
fishing nations have sought to lower
fisheries access fees paid in their bilat-
eral agreements with island states
(already at only 5 percent of catch
value) on the grounds of low market
prices for tuna and increasing fuel
costs. However, under the new agree-
ment, fees paid by the United States
were increased by $3 million com-
pared to the previous treaty, for a
total of $21 million per annum: $18
million paid by the US government
and $3 million by the fishing industry
(Tarte pers comm 2003).
The Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries (wcpf) Convention is the
most significant initiative in the world
to manage migratory fish. It is the first
regional agreement to implement the
United Nation’s agreement on Strad-
dling Fish Stocks (1995) and consti-
tutes an unprecedented endeavor to
facilitate cooperation between the
island coastal states and distant-water
fishing nations. The convention was
adopted in Honolulu in September
2000 after negotiations dating back 
to 1994 (Tarte 2002a).
In 2002 the second and third
Preparatory Conferences (PrepCons)
for the Establishment of the Commis-
sion for the Conservation and Man-
agement of Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks in the Western and Central
Pacific were held in Madang in Febru-
ary and in Manila in November. The
role of the PrepCons is to design the
organizational and financial frame-
work so that the wcpf Commission
can be established once the conven-
tion enters into force. Forum leaders
urged those members who had not
done so to ratify or accede to the
convention.
All seventeen members of the
Forum Fisheries Agency (ffa)
attended the third PrepCon, along
with representatives of eleven other
states and territories, including the
fishing nations. Japan returned to the
negotiating table after having boy-
cotted the proceedings since it voted
against the convention’s adoption in
2000. The United States, France, and
New Zealand finally agreed to the
participation of their Pacific Island
territories in the decision-making
process.
The third PrepCon considered
sensitive and complex issues including
financial arrangements and the moni-
toring, control, and surveillance (mcs)
regime. Progress in these areas was
thus slow and incremental. Japan
succeeded in having a resolution
passed on the need to curb illegal,
unreported, and unregulated fishing.
Despite abiding differences between
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fishing and coastal nations on the
issue, progress was made on the prin-
ciples to govern high seas boarding
and inspection, and on the commis-
sion’s observer program to undertake
mcs functions (Tarte 2002b).
Forum members gained more
recognition of the special requirements
of the small island developing states
party to the wcpf Convention. An
imperative highlighted in their collec-
tive opening statement was to ensure
their “full and effective participation”
in the work of the commission. To this
end they lobbied strongly for recurrent
funding to cover the costs of Island
states attending commission meetings
and to facilitate their capacity to carry
out conservation and management.
However, the meeting failed to resolve
the size of the convention’s Special
Requirements Fund to assist the
developing states (Tarte 2002b).
The PrepCon was also unable to
agree on the formula for determining
member contributions to the overall
budget of the commission. The Forum
Fisheries Agency proposed a budget of
us$4 to 6 million, which is not unrea-
sonable in view of the annual catch
value of us$1.5 billion. A decision
was reached on locating the commis-
sion’s headquarters in the Federated
States of Micronesia. Unfortunately,
rivalry on this issue revealed divisions
among Island countries, which, if
unresolved, could undermine the soli-
darity and bargaining power of the
Forum group at future meetings
(Tarte 2002b).
Whales are of lesser economic sig-
nificance to Pacific states than tuna
stocks but are nevertheless becoming
an asset for operators catering to the
burgeoning demand for ecotourism.
Surprisingly, this is not an environ-
mental issue on which the Pacific
Island states are united. The Forum
communiqué welcomed the establish-
ment of whale sanctuaries in Austra-
lia, the Cook Islands, Niue, and Papua
New Guinea, as well as the fact that
whales are also protected by national
legislation in New Zealand, Sämoa,
and Tonga. The Forum invited mem-
bers who had not done so “to declare
their respective waters as whale sanc-
tuaries.” However, this statement was
qualified by the “strong reservations
of some members” who had begun to
support the pro-whaling lobby (pif
2002, para 41).
The campaign to extend whale pro-
tection has been set back by Japan’s
concerted and now infamous check-
book diplomacy. In May 2002 a joint
Australian and New Zealand initiative
to establish a South Pacific whale
sanctuary failed because it was unable
to achieve the three-quarters majority
required in the International Whaling
Commission (iwc). Palau and Solo-
mon Islands both voted in a bloc of
countries with Japan against the pro-
posed sanctuary. Later in the year the
two Pacific Island nations also voted
in support of Iceland joining the Inter-
national Whaling Commission, even
though Iceland does not recognize the
global moratorium on commercial
whaling.
It is alleged that by the end of
2002, nine (mostly small-island)
developing states had joined the Inter-
national Whaling Commission for the
express purpose of voting on any issue
with Japan. Since 1987 Japan has
provided aid to these “pro-whaling”
nations in the order of us$320 mil-
lion, including over us$10 million to
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Solomon Islands. An official of the
Fisheries Agency of Japan has admit-
ted to using fisheries grant aid to buy
votes. At a workshop on the proposed
Pacific whale sanctuary in April 2001,
a Tongan delegate complained that
Japanese officials had explicitly linked
the issues of aid and whales in discus-
sions with his country but Tonga had
rejected the overtures (Greenpeace
2002a).
Palau must have been rewarded
handsomely to support Japan’s pro-
whaling agenda, as this Micronesian
nation is otherwise renowned for its
progressive environment policies.
There are fears that the pro-whaling
bloc may eventually grow large
enough to overturn the iwc morato-
rium. Japan has indicated its intention
to lobby to overturn the ban on trade
in whale products in the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered
Species. Japan may seek additional
Pacific Island recruits for these cam-
paigns. As the largest or second largest
aid donor to most Island states, Japan
has considerable leverage. Regional
solidarity has resisted Japanese pres-
sure to water down tuna conservation
measures, notably in the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Convention,
but Island states clearly perceive less
of a vested interest in the fate of
whales (Tarte 2002c).
The main regional meeting of the
year on the environment was the
Seventh Pacific Islands Conference
held in the Cook Islands and orga-
nized by the South Pacific Regional
Environment Programme. Scientists,
politicians, activists, and bureaucrats
from the region convened to address
pressing environmental challenges.
The conference theme, “Mainstream-
ing Nature Conservation,” advocated
the integration of conservation and
sustainable development into all levels
of government planning, legislation,
and action. Resolutions targeted key
issues for further action, including:
climate change, invasive species,
management of marine areas, bird
conservation, and whale sanctuaries
(IB, Aug 2002). 
In keeping with the concept of
mainstreaming the environment, the
South Pacific Regional Environment
Programme organized a joint meeting
of regional economic and environment
ministers in Fiji in May. The forum’s
aim was to explore barriers to main-
streaming the environment, with adap-
tation to climate change as the case
study. The Forum Economic Ministers
Meeting in July maintained the
momentum by discussing linkages
between economics and the environ-
ment. Both groups agreed for their
Chairs to attend each other’s annual
meetings and to encourage further
interaction between their respective
secretariats (IB, Sept 2002). 
The single largest global conference
on environmental matters was the UN
World Summit on Sustainable Devel-
opment (wssd) held in Johannesburg
in September. The summit was to
review the progress made since the
Rio Earth Summit of 1992 and to
determine new goals and strategies for
the coming decade. Overall the record
of achievement has been less than
impressive, with levels of official
development assistance in decline
(including such assistance to the
Pacific), increasing global poverty, and
worsening environment problems.
Progress has been slow in implement-
ing the ambitious global conventions
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agreed to at Rio, including the one to
combat climate change.
Pacific Island regional organizations
and governments spent two years pre-
paring a regional submission to the
World Summit on Sustainable Devel-
opment. The Council of Regional
Organizations of the Pacific, the
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, and
the South Pacific Regional Environ-
ment Programme coordinated this
effort. At the summit, delegations
from the Pacific Islands and the Alli-
ance of Small Island States highlighted
the common problems affecting them.
Their unity was rewarded by the
inclusion of a chapter dedicated to the
“Sustainable development of Small
Island Developing States (sids)” in
the wssd Plan of Implementation
(PM/IB April 2002; IB Oct 2002).
This wssd chapter builds on
earlier achievements by Small Island
Developing States in Agenda 21 at the
1992 Earth Summit, the Programme
for Action for the Sustainable Devel-
opment of sids at Barbados in 1994,
and the decisions adopted by the
twenty-second special session of the
UN General Assembly. The sids
chapter specifies actions to be taken
with support from aid donors and 
the multilateral Global Environment
Facility in areas including: fisheries,
coastal and regional seas management,
marine and coastal biodiversity, fresh-
water programs, pollution control,
sustainable tourism, disaster manage-
ment, adaptation to impacts of climate
change, and renewable energy. Envi-
ronmental concerns dominated the
sids agenda for action, as these
underpin the long-term health and
livelihood of Islanders. The chapter
concluded with a UN commitment to
review a decade’s progress toward
sids goals in 2004 (wssd 2002,
41–43).
A major new environmental cam-
paign has been launched in the Pacific
Islands to clean up persistent organic
pollutants (pops). The insidious 
man-made pollutants are “resistant 
to degradation, they can accumulate
rapidly, move easily through air and
water, and travel with migratory
species across international bound-
aries, invading ecosystems on both
land and sea” (PM, July 2002). Persis-
tent organic pollutants are stored in
the fatty reserves of people and ani-
mals and can be found in tissues of all
living organisms the world over. Due
to the serious threat posed by these
chemicals, ten Pacific Island states
have joined the Stockholm Conven-
tion to combat them.
The Stockholm treaty was adopted
in May 2001 after six years of negoti-
ations. However, the extent of the
hazard in the region was already well
documented by a report from the
Australian Agency for International
Development (AusAID). It identified
chemical stockpiles in more than fifty
contaminated sites in thirteen Pacific
Island countries. The Global Environ-
ment Facility offers funding to address
national waste problems. About us$2
million has been granted to four
Pacific Island states, with the other 
six signatories also applying for funds
(PM, July 2002).
Greenpeace issued a damning
critique of major aid donors who have
promoted incineration as a solution to
waste problems in the Pacific. Inciner-
ation poses a serious threat to the
health of communities and the envi-
ronment, as such facilities emit toxic
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chemicals into the atmosphere. Health
effects can include adverse impacts on
the respiratory and immune systems
and may contribute to heart disease,
cancer, and congenital abnormalities.
Dioxin is one of the twelve worst per-
sistent organic pollutants identified by
the Stockholm Convention. Incinera-
tion is one of the largest sources of
dioxin pollution. It is therefore alarm-
ing that “the region is experiencing an
expansion of incineration as the tech-
nology of choice for waste manage-
ment by donor agencies.” The World
Bank is funding three such projects in
Sämoa, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea
(Penjueli 2002, 39).
The origins of the “pops in the
Pacific” campaign dates back to 1997,
when the Australian Agency for Inter-
national Development instigated a
study to ascertain priorities for
improved waste management. It con-
cluded that a large-scale program was
needed to identify and manage chemi-
cal waste. With AusAID funding, the
South Pacific Regional Environment
Programme undertook the first phase
in 1998, to assess the extent of con-
tamination at sites throughout the
Pacific and make recommendations
for their disposal. Phase two will
involve actual disposal and remedia-
tion of contaminated sites.
The phase one report proposed
incineration as the simplest disposal
option for the wide range of wastes in
the Pacific. “At a time when Australia
is actively seeking to reduce the num-
ber of medical incinerators and has
banned the development of high tem-
perature incineration for pops waste,
it seems incongruous . . . for an
AusAID report to propose incinera-
tion for Pacific island states” (Penjueli
2002, 44). Indeed, because of health
and environmental concerns about
incineration, Australia is a leader in
developing alternative technologies
for the safe disposal of persistent
organic pollutants. Greenpeace advo-
cates that Australia provide this new
technology to the Pacific (Greenpeace
2002b).
The Stockholm Convention on per-
sistent organic pollutants complements
the 1998 Waigani Convention banning
the importation of hazardous and
radioactive waste into the region. 
The Waigani Convention came under
challenge in 2002 from a bid by the
Solomon Islands government to
import waste from Taiwan as a
desperate revenue-raising measure. 
In early May the government
approved a license to a Taiwanese
company to transport 3 million tons
of waste to Solomon Islands in return
for a us$200 million down payment
and a further us$35 million for each
shipment of 10,000 tons. It then came
to light that the waste was toxic, as 
it contained high concentrations of
heavy metal. The Solomon Islands
agriculture and quarantine divisions
finally cancelled the license on the
grounds that the country lacked the
resources to manage the waste and
because it would contravene the
Waigani ban (PNB, May 2002, 11).
Another practical initiative in the
region is the International Waters
Programme (iwp), also funded by the
Global Environment Facility, imple-
mented by the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme and executed by
the South Pacific Regional Environ-
ment Programme. The Forum Fish-
eries Agency and the Secretariat of the
Pacific Community will run the three-
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year oceanic program, which focuses
on managing fish stocks. The coastal
program features community pilot
projects run by national coordinators
in fourteen Pacific Island countries
and will run for five years. Partic-
ipating countries can access up to
us$400,000 each for approved envi-
ronmental initiatives. The priorities
are to promote better management 
of marine protected areas, coastal
fisheries, community waste, and fresh
water conservation (PM/IB, June
2002).
Access to adequate supplies of
water is becoming critical. Fresh water
is a precious resource at the best of
times for the atoll nations, but during
recent droughts several countries,
including the Cook Islands, Kiribati,
the Marshall Islands, Nauru, and
Tonga, have been subject to severe
water shortages. The situation has
worsened due to increasing demands
on water by urban dwellers, industry,
tourism, and agriculture. Even in Fiji,
Sämoa, and Solomon Islands, which
enjoy ample rainfall, populations face
chronic water shortages due to factors
such as pollution and inefficient deliv-
ery of water. At a recent meeting
organized by the Asian Development
Bank and the South Pacific Applied
Geoscience Commission, Pacific Island
nations agreed on a regional action
plan for sustainable water manage-
ment (PM, Nov 2002).
Australia also experienced a
devastating drought in 2002 and early
2003, which contributed to a dramatic
decline in agricultural output and to
massive bushfires. The El Niño phe-
nomenon has long been linked to
extreme weather events in the Pacific.
New research by the World Wildlife
Fund suggests that global warming is
also a major contributing factor to
the severity of the recent drought in
the region. Australia should thus be a
leading advocate of efforts to combat
climate change. To the consternation
of its Island neighbors, the opposite is
true. In 2002 Australia announced it
would not ratify the 1997 Kyoto Pro-
tocol, which features binding targets
for cutting greenhouse gas emissions.
Not only is Australia expected to
exceed its Kyoto target of 8 percent
growth in emissions between 1990
and 2010, but a government report
leaked in April estimated that output
would be 33 percent higher by 2010.
Australia’s disappointing performance
on this issue is, however, surpassed by
another ostensible friend to the Pacific.
The United States announced its
withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol
in March 2001. A year later President
George W Bush announced an energy
plan to cut “greenhouse gas intensity”
by 18 percent over the next ten years.
The publicity was misleading, as it
really referred to reducing the propor-
tion of emissions in relation to growth
in gross domestic product. Far from
constituting a real cut, the World
Resources Institute estimated that the
Bush plan would involve a 14 percent
increase in emissions by the US in the
coming decade. US emissions would
thus be 33 percent above the Kyoto
1990 baseline by 2012, compared
with a commitment to an average 5
percent cut by other developed coun-
tries party to the treaty (PNB, Feb
2002, 9).
Instead of ratifying the Kyoto
treaty, the United States and Australia
announced the Climate Action Part-
nership (cap) as a bold initiative in
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February 2002. cap projects include
information exchange and research
into cleaner energy technologies. The
United States and Australia would
also assist developing nations in mon-
itoring climate impacts and in build-
ing their capacity to adapt to climate
risks. Two of the world’s worst green-
house gas emitters are thus insisting
that other nations adapt to adverse
impacts rather than devising meaning-
ful strategies and commitments to cut
the emissions causing these impacts
(acf 2003). The World Bank is simi-
larly focused on its clients preparing
strategies of “adaptation” to climate
change. Pacific Island nations, the
Forum, and the South Pacific
Regional Environment Programme
have little choice but to engage in
planning for worst-case scenarios.
The Eighth Conference of Parties
(cop8) to the UN Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (unfccc)
held in November stressed that, in
addition to mitigation, high priority
must be given to adaptation, espe-
cially for least-developed countries
and small island developing states. To
this end the conference devised guide-
lines for funding from the Global
Environment Facility to assist devel-
oping countries in adapting to climate
change impacts and obtaining clean
technologies. The Delhi declaration
called for ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol, although Australia and the
United States were unmoved by this
appeal. By the end of 2002 one hun-
dred countries—including the Euro-
pean Union, Japan, Canada, New
Zealand, and eleven other Forum
members—had ratified. If Russia
ratifies it, the protocol could enter into
force in 2003. However, the declara-
tion noted that developed countries
still have much work to do to meet
their targeted cuts in emissions by
2012 (unfccc 2002).
As litigation to compensate a range
of harmful effects is increasing expo-
nentially worldwide, climate change 
is set to be the next focus for a legal
challenge. The government of Tuvalu
is considering the options for suing
the United States, Australia, or multi-
national companies over their failure
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and over
their disproportionate contribution to
climate change, which is threatening
the low-lying nation. The United
States is the single biggest greenhouse
gas emitter, while Australia has the
highest per capita emissions. In 2001
Tuvalu had appealed to Australia and
New Zealand to consider giving its
people “special visas” in the event that
they become environmental refugees
from rising sea levels, but this request
was rejected. Tuvalu is a poor nation
of only 10,000 people that can ill
afford to fund an international legal
action; however, it may receive spon-
sorship from nongovernment organi-
zations keen to mount a test case
(PNB, March 2002, 6).
A briefing paper by the Australian
Conservation Foundation (acf)
argued that there are grounds for
litigation because, according to the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, there is ample evidence of
increasing temperature, rising sea lev-
els, and decreasing snow and ice cover
worldwide over the past century. This
trend is coupled with an increase in
the intensity and frequency of extreme
weather events in the form of drought,
floods, and cyclones. Compensation
claims would be legitimate because
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climate change incurs demonstrable
economic loss from natural disasters.
In addition, climate change contrib-
utes to health hazards, including death
and injury from disasters and vector-
borne diseases like malaria (acf
2002). The challenge in legal terms
will be to prove a direct cause-and-
effect link between the actions of
specific countries and companies, 
and climate change. 
In the Pacific, climate trends are
already adversely impacting the envi-
ronment, health, and economic devel-
opment. In some countries drought
has severely affected the production of
food and export crops. Coral bleach-
ing has been attributed to global
warming; this phenomenon is under-
mining a key tourism asset and a
major resource for subsistence fishing.
Changes in weather patterns have
altered the movement of migratory
fish and left Pacific Island countries
with substantial reductions in seasonal
tuna catches. Climate change has con-
tributed to higher levels of erosion
affecting coastal roads, bridges, and
plantations. Warmer temperatures
have led to outbreaks of malaria in
areas of Melanesia previously too cold
for mosquitoes (acfoa 2002, 3–4).
Due to their vulnerability, the
Pacific Islands have taken every
opportunity over the past decade to
urge greater action against climate
change. This issue was prominent in
the first chapter of the 1994 Barbados
plan of action for small island devel-
oping states. The momentum of this
campaign picked up in 2002. At the
acp summit in Nadi, Fiji’s prime min-
ister made reference to the likelihood
of rising sea levels creating environ-
mental refugees (Qarase 2002). A
detailed statement was made in the
communiqué of Forum leaders, in
spite of Australia’s perennial desire to
play down the issue there, and at the
subsequent World Summit where cli-
mate change was a focus for debate.
The Forum “encouraged the US
and all other major emitters” to
combat climate change and ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol. Island leaders
supported efforts to coordinate the
region’s response to climate change
including a roundtable process and a
comprehensive review by the Council
of Regional Organizations in the
Pacific of all relevant outcomes of 
the World Summit. They called for a
mobilization of resources to prepare
for adaptation to climate change while
noting that such measures had been
rendered more urgent by an interna-
tional failure to tackle the causes in a
timely manner. For their part, Forum
leaders saw a need to plan future
coastal developments in order to
manage the adverse impacts of climate
change. To this end they proposed the
development of national Comprehen-
sive Hazard And Risk Management
plans (pif 2002, paras 24–31).
Australia gives the region cause for
bewilderment. As a greenhouse gas
emitter it contributes to the problems
faced by the Pacific Islands, including
displacement and migration due to
rising sea levels. Ironically, while
Australia has asked diminutive island
nations to host asylum seekers under
the Pacific Solution, it has been
unwilling to countenance receiving
environmental refugees in the future
(von Strokirch 2002). Yet Australia
has been a key financial supporter of
efforts by the Forum nations to moni-
tor and adapt to climate change. Aus-
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tralia has funded the South Pacific Sea
Level and Climate Monitoring Project
since its inception in 1991 and will
continue to do so until 2005. Austra-
lia has also provided significant fund-
ing through the Global Environment
Facility to the regional Pacific Islands
Climate Change Assistance Pro-
gramme (acfoa 2002, 4).
It is little wonder that Australia is
sending the Pacific Islands mixed
messages on environmental policies,
notably with respect to climate
change. Australia has been character-
ized as a “laggard state” internation-
ally for its environmental record. In
per capita terms it has the world’s sec-
ond highest level of waste production,
the fifth highest water consumption,
and more than double the developed
country average for greenhouse gas
emissions. In the past decade Austra-
lia has become a “renegade state” by
acting as a spoiler at negotiations for
global environmental regimes, includ-
ing the Kyoto Protocol and the World
Summit (Christoff 2002, 3). The US
administration has exhibited similar
tendencies since Bush came to power.
Australia’s penchant for exploiting
the Oceanic desire for consensus and
pressuring the Forum leaders to water
down statements on climate change is
well known. Submissions by numer-
ous nongovernment organizations and
concerned individuals to the Austra-
lian Senate inquiry into relations with
the Pacific Islands pointed to the awk-
ward disjuncture between Australia’s
purported commitment to the region
and its continuing intransigence on
the need to act convincingly and
urgently to combat climate change
(see, eg, acfoa 2002).
Antinuclear sentiment driven by
concern to protect the environment
has traditionally united the region to
protest and ultimately prohibit dan-
gerous activities undertaken by exter-
nal powers. The thirty-year campaign
against nuclear testing finally saw the
last Pacific test held by France in
1996. Japan’s bid in the 1980s to
dump nuclear waste in the Pacific
Ocean was banned under interna-
tional law. To date, attempts by multi-
national companies to export nuclear
waste for dumping on land in the
Pacific Islands have been thwarted by
the regional Waigani Convention. Not
surprisingly, then, the shipment of
radioactive materials through the
Pacific has evoked impassioned
opposition.
Japan has been shipping nuclear
waste to Europe for reprocessing since
the late 1960s. A shipment of one ton
of plutonium, passing through the
Pacific in 1992, provoked an inter-
national outcry. Due to domestic and
international opposition, reprocessed
materials have since been shipped in
the form of mixed plutonium and
uranium oxide, known as mox fuel.
In 1999 while a shipment to Japan
was en route, it was revealed that
British Nuclear Fuels Limited (bnfl)
had falsified quality control data
relating to the cargo of mox fuel. As
a result, in 2000 Japan sent the sus-
pect fuel back to the United Kingdom
and received compensation of 110
million British pounds. A new ship-
ment of replacement fuel was sent to
Japan via the Pacific in 2002 under
armed guard (Maclellan 2002, 27–28).
At the 2000 Forum in Kiribati,
Japan offered to establish a “good-
will” trust fund to cover initial costs
to the Pacific Islands in the event of
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an accident involving the shipment of
radioactive materials. A principal of
us$10 million is to be invested in a
Pacific Island Development Coopera-
tion Fund with the interest used to
finance development projects. The
council managing the fund would
include equal representation from
Japan and the Forum. Japan subse-
quently became alarmed about the
political and legal implications of
explicitly linking the fund to the issue
of an accident as this would under-
mine the claim of French and British
shipping agents that there is virtually
no chance of such an accident occur-
ring. At the 2001 Forum meeting in
Nauru Japan sought to remove direct
references to accidents from the draft
Fund Management Guidelines (PNB,
Aug 2001, 3).
As with climate change, Australia is
completely out of step with its Island
neighbors on the subject of nuclear
shipments through the Pacific because
of its vested interests. First, Australia
profits from the nuclear fuel cycle
through its export of uranium, includ-
ing to Japan and France. It is thus
reluctant to criticize the practices of
countries reliant on nuclear power and
associated shipments. Second, it has a
small nuclear reactor for research pur-
poses. This creates reprocessing and
waste problems for Australia itself.
Third, from an arms control perspec-
tive, Australia supports an interna-
tional regime limiting the number of
countries with nuclear reprocessing
facilities, as these could be diverted 
to weapons production. Australia and
Japan are thus committed to shipping
their spent nuclear fuel elsewhere for
reprocessing. This conflict of interest
means that Australia pushes for much
milder statements on the nuclear ship-
ments issue at Forum meetings than
the other leaders, including New
Zealand, would like.
In November 1999 and January
2001 Australia sent shipments of
spent fuel rods from the Lucas Heights
reactor in Sydney through the Pacific
to France. Eventually the same nuclear
materials will be returned after repro-
cessing. Australia is proceeding with
plans to build a second research reac-
tor. This facility will require further
shipments overseas of spent fuel to be
reprocessed for reuse or conditioned
for disposal. It therefore comes as no
surprise that the Australian govern-
ment proclaims its confidence in the
effectiveness of existing arrangements
by the International Maritime Organi-
zation and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (iaea) concerning the
shipment of nuclear materials.
The agency advises that, since ship-
ments began in the 1960s, “there has
never been an accident during the
transport of nuclear materials that has
resulted in any release of radioactiv-
ity.” Any restrictions on the route of
such shipments are rejected because:
“International law grants all states the
right of freedom of navigation on the
high seas or through Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zones and the right of inno-
cent passage through territorial seas
of states” (dfat 2002).
Pacific Island nations and non-
government critics have responded
that if nuclear shipments are so safe,
the companies and countries con-
cerned should have no qualms about
accepting full liability in the event of
an accident. They would also like to
be advised in detail of the plans for
an emergency response to assess their
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adequacy. In contrast to the reassur-
ances provided by the International
Atomic Energy Agency and shipping
nations, Pacific Islanders and the envi-
ronmental watchdog Greenpeace are
far from convinced about the safety
of nuclear shipments.
Shipping nations claim that the ves-
sels “have safety features far in excess
of those on conventional cargo ships
including double hulls . . . [and the
mox is] placed in casks to withstand
collision, fire and submersion” to
depths of thousands of meters (dfat
2002). Greenpeace says that two ships
currently in use in the Pacific fleet are
not fully double hulled. Greenpeace
also asserts that the casks containing
nuclear materials have been insuffi-
ciently tested for the ability to with-
stand extended high temperature fires
on board ships (Greenpeace 2002c;
Deere-Jones 2002).
A chemical tanker, which was dou-
ble hulled and met the highest interna-
tional standards, nevertheless sank in
the English Channel in 2000. A Brit-
ish warship ran aground near Lord
Howe Island, Australia, in July 2002,
while at year’s end an oil tanker broke
up off the coast of Spain causing
untold damage to the environment
and the fishing industry. These acci-
dents highlight the real risks posed by
transporting hazardous substances at
sea (or in the air), and the risks are
multiplied when the cargo involves
long-lived radioactive substances.
The nuclear companies and their
advocates, including Australia, have
repeatedly assured the coastal states,
including those in the Pacific, that
there are “comprehensive emergency
response plans and safety procedures
to minimize the environmental risks of
an accident, no matter how unlikely”
(dfat 2002). For example, the British
company (bnfl) has a set of special
arrangements for responding to at-sea
emergencies involving nuclear materi-
als. These are considered to be com-
mercial in confidence and are the sole
property of the company. Their con-
tents are not available to the public 
or even to the governments of coastal
nations on the route of shipments
(Deere-Jones 2002, 3).
The four nations involved in the
controversial shipments of nuclear
materials through the Pacific—namely
Japan, France, the United Kingdom,
and to a lesser extent Australia—also
rank among the major aid donors to
the region. These donors are thus in a
position to exert considerable pressure
on individual island states and even on
regional organizations whose existence
depends to a large extent on a hand-
ful of aid donors. As a consequence,
the Forum is coordinating the regional
campaign but, unlike its Caribbean
counterpart, has stopped short of
demanding an outright cessation of
nuclear shipments. Instead it has
called for prior notification of ship-
ments and clear guarantees concern-
ing liability.
Coastal states along the route of
nuclear shipments in the Caribbean
and the Pacific have repeatedly
expressed fears that an accident
involving nuclear materials would be
devastating to fisheries, tourism, and
other industries dependent on the
marine environment. They have
(unsuccessfully to date) sought written
assurances that the shipping compa-
nies and nations acknowledge liability
for directly or indirectly causing any
damage to regional economies. The
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International Atomic Energy Agency
and parties to the existing interna-
tional liability regime are considering
ways to improve the conventions gov-
erning compensation for accidents
involving nuclear materials and pos-
sibly extending coverage to coastal
states such as those in the Pacific.
However, this process could take years
and the Forum is keen to establish an
interim arrangement to clarify liability.
As it stands, Japan is not a party to
the relevant treaties, the 1960 Paris
Convention and the 1963 Vienna
Convention. Moreover, Forum island
states are unable to accede to these
conventions without the unanimous
consent of all signatories. Most impor-
tantly, from the point of view of the
Pacific, these conventions do not cover
loss arising from the perception of risk
after an accident (Maclellan 2002,
29). The Forum argues that after any
kind of nuclear accident perceptions
alone could be sufficient to deter tour-
ists as well as consumers of Pacific
tuna.
In recognition of public concern,
the shipping nations and companies
launched a public relations campaign
in the Pacific on the safety of nuclear
shipments. Unconvinced, the Forum
established a Working Group on
Liability and Compensation for the
Shipment of Radioactive Materials
Through the Region. It continued
pressing for discussions with shipping
nations (France, United Kingdom, and
Japan) and nuclear industry represen-
tatives. The first meeting was held in
late 1999, followed by a second a year
later, and a third meeting in July 2001.
The shipping nations made assurances
concerning the safety of shipments
and the adequacy of emergency
response plans but did not give any
ground on liability or compensation
(Maclellan 2002, 31–33). A meeting
was anticipated for late 2002 but
failed to eventuate. Another round 
of dialogue will take place in Nadi 
in February 2003.
The International Atomic Energy
Agency is entrusted with developing
internationally accepted standards for
the transport of radioactive material.
It acknowledges that in recent years
substantial concern has arisen among
members of the public and at a politi-
cal level about this issue. The agency
is worried that unless such fears are
put to rest, there could be “unfortu-
nate consequences” in terms of
restricting the delivery of radioactive
substances, including some that are
vital for medical research. Partly with
a view to addressing this concern, the
agency is hosting a major interna-
tional conference in July 2003 in
Vienna on the safe transport of
radioactive material (iaea 2003).
Opposition to nuclear shipments
has burgeoned among coastal states 
in recent years. Latin American and
Caribbean countries have been stri-
dent in their critiques. In March 2001
the Rio group of nineteen Latin Amer-
ican countries invoked their right to
protect their exclusive economic zones
under the Law of the Sea. The Carib-
bean Council for Foreign and Com-
munity Relations reiterated in May
2002 their “implacable and steadfast
opposition to the continued use of the
Caribbean for the trans-shipment of
nuclear waste.” They raised concerns
that, given the international climate
since 11 September 2001, there was
an increased risk that terrorists might
target such shipments. The council
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was also aggrieved over the failure 
to give governments adequate prior
notice of shipments and the absence
of any comprehensive environmental
impact statement. They vowed to
investigate every legal avenue to halt
the shipments (Greenpeace 2002c).
In early June 2002, the congres-
sional representative for Guam,
Robert Underwood, wrote to the US
secretary of state asking that every
possible precaution be taken to ensure
that the health and welfare of the
Pacific Islanders not be jeopardized 
by a possible terrorist act or mishap
at sea. On 20 June, the Australian
Senate passed a resolution with the
support of the opposition parties call-
ing on the government to hold a pub-
lic review of the bilateral Australia
Japan Nuclear Safeguard Agreement.
As Australia has responsibility to 
keep track of any nuclear materials it
exports from the cradle to the grave,
the opposition parties sought to use
this mechanism of Australian Oblig-
ated Nuclear Material as a means to
“expressly deny permission [to Japan]
to transport this shipment of mixed
oxide plutonium nuclear fuel through
our region” (PNB, June 2002, 8).
Regional protests peaked in mid-
2002 as two British freighters, the
Paciﬁc Pintail and the Paciﬁc Teal,
passed through the region carrying
255 kilograms of mox fuel. These
vessels entered the exclusive economic
zones of the Federated States of
Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Solo-
mon Islands, Vanuatu, Papua New
Guinea, and New Caledonia. Individ-
ual governments that issued strong
statements opposing these shipments
included the Federated States of
Micronesia, Cook Islands, New
Zealand, Vanuatu, Fiji, and Nauru.
Unlike the small island developing
states, New Zealand gained a commit-
ment that ships will not transport
nuclear materials through its exclusive
economic zone.
In opening remarks to the Africa
Caribbean Pacific (acp) summit held
in Fiji in July, Fiji Prime Minister
Laisenia Qarase condemned nuclear
shipments in the strongest terms yet:
“this relationship with the ocean will
make it easy for you to understand
why we are so adamantly opposed to
any actions which expose it to threats
of pollution . . . a ship carrying plu-
tonium is headed towards our waters
. . . join with us in expressing our
outrage and opposition to those who
are so willing to put the Pacific and
our peoples at risk” (Fiji Times, 19
July 2002, 24).
It is unprecedented for the Africa
Caribbean Pacific group to comment
on sensitive political issues and Afri-
can countries were unwilling to criti-
cize EU members, namely the United
Kingdom and France. Yet, lobbying
by Pacific and Caribbean members led
to solidarity in the final declaration
by the seventy-eight participating acp
nations: “We express our strong
objection to the transport of nuclear
and other hazardous materials through
the waters around acp states. We call
for the immediate cessation of such
practice in order to prevent any occur-
rence of accidents that could seriously
threaten their sustainable development
and the health of their peoples” (acp
2002, Article 50).
The Pacific Islands Forum began
expressing its concerns about nuclear
shipments at its 1992 meeting and
since then has repeated them in every
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annual communiqué. The 2002 meet-
ing of leaders welcomed the growing
international recognition of the con-
cerns of small island states regarding
radioactive shipments. They expressed
disappointment that the shipping
states had not met with Forum mem-
bers prior to the 2002 leaders meeting
to discuss proposals for “innovative
arrangements and assurances.” While
noting Australia’s reservations, the
Forum reiterated its “serious con-
cerns” and called on shipping states
to accept “full responsibility and lia-
bility for compensation for any dam-
age which may result,” and for the
“advanced notification and consulta-
tions by shipping states with States in
the region” (pif 2002, paras 33–34).
The whole thrust of the region’s
proactive environment diplomacy has
been criticized by the director of the
South Pacific Applied Geoscience
Commission. Alfred Simpson argued
that although global warming, nuclear
issues, and overfishing are externally
imposed problems, the island states
need to get their own house in order
with respect to managing the envi-
ronment and addressing basic needs
before launching crusades at the
international level (PNB, Aug and 
Sep 2002). It would seem logical to
mount campaigns on both fronts, for
if Pacific Islanders are not vigilant in
protecting their ocean, the very basis
of their economies and livelihoods
may be threatened.
Island states are often not able to
count on the support of former colo-
nial powers and current aid donors in
environmental campaigns. New Zea-
land is an exception and routinely
sides with Pacific Islanders. Australia
and the United States are in the oppo-
site camp on climate change. Japan,
France, the United Kingdom, Austra-
lia, and the International Atomic
Energy Agency form an awesome
coalition defending the right of pas-
sage for nuclear shipments. Japan 
also has a longstanding reputation for
undermining regional efforts to pro-
tect tuna stocks, not to mention its
pro-whaling stance. The Forum is
often criticized for not taking a
stronger stand on these controversial
issues. In contrast, the diminutive
island nations should be applauded
for the extent to which they do dare
to speak out collectively against the
practices of key aid donors.
karin von strokirch
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